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POST-CONVICTION DUE PROCESS REGARDING INSANITY
CLAIM PRIOR TO EXECUTION
Howard C. Michaelsen, Jr.
The extent to which the trial procedure concept of due process is applicable
to procedures after conviction has been re-examined by the United States
Supreme Court in Solesbec v. Balkcom.' The petitioner was fairly tried and
convicted of first degree murder in a Georgia state court.2 While awaiting
execution, he petitioned the Governor for a stay, alleging that he had become
insane. In accordance with state statute,3 the Governor appointed three
physicians who conducted an examination and declared the petitioner sane.
Thereupon Solesbee instituted habeas corpus action in a Superior County
Court of Georgia, claiming that the method and manner of the inquiry as to
his sanity constituted a violation of rights guaranteed him by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. 4 The county court sustained a
demurrer to the petition and the judgment was affirmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court.5 Reviewing the case on appeal, 6 the United States Supreme
Court found that the Georgia statute providing for the handling insanity
claims by convicted prisoners was not violative of due process of law.
7
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black reiterates the Court's consistent
position that a vast distinction exists between the constitutional guarantees
which protect the accused before and during trial and those which may survive
for his protection after conviction. 8 The Court has decided that many of
those due process rights required to assure trial with "scrupulous fairness" 9
are not necessary to a just determination of post-conviction questions. At the
trial the defendant must have an opportunity to be confronted by, and
cross-examine, the witnesses against him,' 0 but during a post-conviction
inquiry to determine sentence such opportunity may be denied without viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment." Due process requires that the defendant
have notice of the charges and an opportunity to offer evidence at the trial,' 2
but the convict need not have like protections in a hearing which results
in a parole revocation.' 3 These are examples of the distinction between trial
1. 70 Sup. Ct. 457 (1950).
2. Soloesbee v. State, 204 Ga. 16, 48 S.E. 2d 834 (1948).
3. "Disposition of insane convicts. * * " Upon satisfactory evidence being offered to
the Governor that a person convicted of a capital offense has become insane subsequent
to his conviction, the Governor may, within his discretion, have said person examined by
such expert physicians as the Governor may choose; and said physicians shall report to
the Governor the result of their investigation; and the Governor may, if he shall determine
that the person convicted has become insane have the power of committing him to Milledge-
ville State Hospital until his sanity shall have been restored, * ." GA. CODE ANN. sec.
27-2602, Acts 1903, p. 77.
4. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 458 (1950). (The petitioner contended that the
due procc,s clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that his claim of insanity be
determined by a judicial or adirinitrative tribunal after notice and hearing in which he
could be represented by counsel, cross-examine witnesses and offer evidence).
5. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 205 Ga. 122. 52 S.E. 2d 433 (1949).
6. Appeal taken under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2 . (State statute challenged as repugnant to
Federal Constitution after highest state court has decided in favor of its validity).
7. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissenting; Mr. Justice Douglas not sitting.
8. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
9. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 459 (1950).
10. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
11. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
12. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
13. Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216 (1932).
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court and post-conviction due process which reflect the traditional attitude
that the convict, once fairly tried and proven guilty, may gain any type of
reprieve only by way of executive clemency. 14 The distinction has also been
explained in terms of the need for more detailed safeguards when the de-
termination rests in the hands of a lay jury rather than a judge or expert
tribunal. 15 In any event, it appears that due process requires fewer pro-
cedural protections after pronouncement of a guilty verdict than before. As
a result a more limited group of rights are guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment in such post-conviction procedures as the investigation of an
insanity claim of a prisoner awaiting capital punishment.
The Solesbee case, together with certain language from the previous opinion
of Phyle v. Duffy, 16 indicates the possible existence of a post-conviction due
process right heretofore unestablished; i.e., the right of a prisoner under death
sentence not to be executed while insane. This historic prohibition was clearly
recognized by the early common law.' 7 It has been codified, in one form or
another, by a majority of our states.' 8 The purpose here is to examine the
possibility and propriety of its existence and operation as a part of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As far back as 1897, in Nobels v. Georgia,'9 the Supreme Court ruled that a
fairly convicted prisoner under death sentence had no due process right to
have a claim of supervening insanity tried by a jury. At that time the
Georgia statute provided that in order to determine the sanity or insanity
of a person under sentence of death, the sheriff should summon a special jury
to conduct the inquiry.20 If the jury found the convict insane, the execution
was to be suspended until a new execution warrant was issued by the original
convicting judge. Although it is evident from the statutory language that the
inquisition itself was entirely at the discretion of the sheriff and, in case of
suspension, a new execution warrant could be issued anytime at the discretion
of the judge, the Supreme Court nevertheless decided that there was no viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. The absolute right to a hearing before
a judge or jury was held not to carry over to such a post-conviction inquiry
and this position has generally been upheld in both federal and state courts
2 '
in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary. 2 2 The frequently.
14. See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 99 (1928) ; Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27,
42 (1916) ; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380 (1866) ; Ex parte Vell,, 18 flow. 307, 310
(1855).
15. "We are unable to say that it offends due process for a state to deem its Governor
an 'apt and special tribunal' to pass upon a question so closely re!ated to powers that from
the beginning have been entrusted to Governors. And here the Governor had the aid of
physicians specially trained in appraising the elusive and often deceptive symptoms of
insanity." Solesbee v. Balkcom, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 459 (1950).
16. 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
17. "Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence .... and if after
judgment he becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed; for peradventure,
says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory he might
have alleged something in stay of . . . execution." 4 BL. CosmM. *24, 25.
"... or, if after judgment he become of non-sane memory, his execution shall be spared:
for were he of sound memory, he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution."
I HALE PLEAS CR. *34, 35.
18. For the complete list of state statutory provisions, See Solesbee v. Balkcom, 70 Sup.
Ct. 457, 465 (1950) (appendix to dissenting opinion).
19. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
20. Ga. Code (1882) sec. 4666, Acts 1859, p. 50.
21. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949): Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216
(1932) ; See Notes, 49 A.L.R. 801 (1927) ; 38 L.R.A. 577 (1898).
22. Not quite one half of the states have provision for hearing claims of insanity super-
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cited decision in the Nobels case is a basic illustration of the rule that not only
does the claimant lack the right to any particular procedure during the sanity
inquisition but that he may also be denied a right to any hearing at all.
Recently in Phyle v. Duffy 23 the usual holdings upon the issue were subject
to considerable clarification, if not modification. Awaiting execution, Phyle
had been judged insane according to the California statutory procedure
whereby the prison warden must, upon belief that the convict is insane, in-
form the county court which, in turn, is required to conduct a regular jury
trial of the convict's sanity.24 Phyle was committed to the state mental
hospital, but shortly thereafter, the superintendent, under statutory author-
ity,25 certified him restored to sanity and a new execution day was set. In
challenging the constitutionality of this procedure Phyle brought habeas
corpus. After a denial of the writ by the California Supreme Court,2 6 the
United States Supreme Court granted eertiorari. 27 Referring to a statement
filed by the Attorney General of California. 28 the Court held that habeas
corpus was not the correct remedy, but rather that mandamus should be sought
to compel the warden to initiate a new sanity trial. In the opinion the Court,
specifically distinguishing the doctrine of the Nobels case,2 9 reopened the ques-
tion of the right of a prisoner, in a state which bars execution of the insane,
to challenge a discretionary ex parte determination of sanity. Moreover, in a
concurring opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by three other justices, 0
states his understanding that the majority opinion "presupposes that Cal-
ifornia affords petitioner the means of challenging in a substantial way the
ex parte finding* and enables him to secure judicial determination of
the claims; I has made." 3' Even before the Phyle case returned to the
California courts, another condemned California prisoner, relying on Phyle
v. Duffyi, brought mandamus to compel the warden to initiate a sanity inquisi-
tion. The California Supreme Court denied relief in that case,3 2 and also in a
subsequent mandamus action by Phyle,33 because of lack of evidence. In both
instances, however, the petitioners received an opportunity to present evidence
and conduct arguments in court. Presumably, if the California Supreme Court
had found evidence showing "a good reason to believe" 3 4 that either convict
vening conviction by a judge or jury. See Solesbee v. Bolkcom, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 465 (1950)
(appendix to dissenting opinion).
23. 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
24. "A person cannot be tried, adjudged to punishment, or punished for a public offense
while insane." CAL. PENAL CODE, sec. 1367.
"0 * 0 If, after his delivery to the warden for execution, there is good reason to believe
that a defendant, under judgment of death, has become insane, the warden must call such
fact to the attention of the district attorney * 0 whose duty it is immediately to file in
superior court a petition, stating * * 0 that the defendant is believed to be insane 0 0 *
thereupon the court must at once cause to be summoned and impanaled E a jury of
twelve persons to hear such inquiry." CAL. PENAL CODE, sec. 3701.
25. " 0 * When the defendant recovers his reason, the superintendent of such hospital
muqt certify the fact to the Governor. who must thereupon issue to the warden his warrant
appointing a day for execution of the judgment * * *." CAL. PENAL CoDE, sec. 3703.
26. In re Phyle, 30 Cal. 2d 838. 186 P. 2d 134- (1947).
27. Phyle v. Duffy, 333 U. S. 941 (1947).
28. "(The Attorney General's) -tatement on the question is entitled to great weight in
the abqence of controlling state statutes and cour decisions." Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U. S. 431,
441 (1948).
29. Id. at 439.
30. Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. justice Murphy, and Mr. Justice Rutledge.
31. Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431, 445 (1948).
32. Williams v. Duffy, 32 Cal. 2d 578, 197 P. 2d 341 (1948).
33. Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal. 2d 144, 208 P. 2d 668 (1949).
34. See note 24 sutra.
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was insane, the warden would have been directed to initiate still another trial
of the basic sanity question.
Although the Phyle ease is cited in the majority opinion of the S.onrsbce case,
the use made of it is restricted to showing that the constitutional issues are sub-
stantial. In general the Solesbee opinion indicates a return to Nobels i'. Geor-
gia, with the exception that some vague area of possible due process violation
is suggested. If the Georgia practice were "designed to execute persons while
insane," '35 or if it "violated the humanitarian policy of G eorgia '"36 it is
indicated that it might be bad. Yet the Georgia statute comes about as close to
a direct practice of executing the insane as any state procedure is likely to
reach, so that in direct effect the exception is one of words only. If. how-
ever, the due process clause can strike down some. or any. state uraetice
of handling a convict's insanity claim, it would seem that the rivht not
to be executed while insane is a federally protected right. Further. if a
discretionary ex parte hearing of sanity in a state which bars execution of the
insane may be challenged by mandamus or otherwise (as indicated in Ph le v,.
Duffy), it would appear that a convict may rely exclusively uon the Four-
teenth Amendment to test the refusal of a desinated official to initiate a
sanity inquisition. And this might be so in spite of the fact that the Court
has continuously affirmed the oft-quoted logic of the Nobels case:
"If it were true that at common law a sugqestion of insanity after sen-
tence. created on the part of the convict an abqolte right to a trial of this
issue by judge and jury, then (as a finding that insanity did not exist at
any one time would not be the thing adjudged as to its non-existence at
another) it would be wholly at the will of the convict to suffer any punish-
ment whatever, for the necessity of his doing so would depend solely upon
his fecundity in making sueiestion after suggestion of insanity, to be
followed by trial upon trial."
37
It should be noted that, to date, the existence of a due process right not
to be executed while insane is dependent upon dicta in the disposition of the
Phyle and Solesbee cases. At least one member of the Court has taken a more
definite stand. In an exhaustive dissent to the Solesbec opinion Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concludes that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits execution
of the insane and further, that the requirements of due process are not met
by the procedure under the Georgia statute. The other view relics for support
upon the long history of the prohibition 38 alonE with an examination of the
manner in which the states have met the problem. 3 9 These criteria, while
certainly relevant, have not been determinative of other Fourteenth Amend-
ment problems. (For example, the jury trial and the privilege against self
incrimination also have long historic precedent and most of the states have
provision for their continuance, yet the Supreme Court has ruled that. under
certain circumstances, they may be abolished and justice still be done.) 40 At
the basis of the common law prohibition is the idea that a sane man always
has some last chance to save himself from the death penalty. 41 As a practical
matter today this idea supposes that the convict, after adequate opportunity
35. S'lesbee v. Balkcom. 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 458 (1950).
36. Id. at 459.
37. Nobels v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 39R, 405-406 (1897).
38. See note 17 sutra.
39. See note 18 supra.
40. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (self-incrimination privilege) ; Walker
v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1875) (jury trial).
41. See note 17 suPra.
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to appeal his conviction,42 may yet have information to save himself and, if
insane, may not be able to impart such information. This presumes a series
of possibilities each one of which is remote, and when combined approach
impossibility.
The petitioner in the Solesbee case suggested another theory for the exten-
sion of the common law prohibition to the Fourteenth Amendment in that
execution of the insane is a "cruel and unusual punishment.' ' 4" The Court
did not reach the question but it would seem difficult to establish that the
execution of a sane man is more humane than the execution of one who is
insane. Whatever element of cruelty might be involved in any of our accepted
methods of execution would seem to be in the anguish of awaiting the punish-
ment. Surely the sane prisoner is as aware of his impending fate as the insane
prisoner, and perhaps much more so.
The methods employed by the states in handling the problem of execution
of the insane presents a somewhat varied picture.4 4 One common character-
istic, however, stands out. In all states the initiation of any action whatever
is entirely discretionary with a single judge or state official. The exercise of"
that discretion by a judge is not subject to review. 45 In only two states,
California and Arkansas, does it appear that there is a right to challenge an
official's refusal to initiate a hearing. The existence of the right to challenge
by mandamus in California was recognized after the Supreme Court's holding
in the Phyle case. In Arkansas it is discretionary with the court as to
whether it will test the official's refusal in "a proper case." 46 It appears
then, that the states have adhered to half the doctrine of the Nobels case in
that the convict has no absolute right to any sanity inquisition whatsoever.
The difference in state legislation is only in the type of procedure which must
be provided once discretion has been affirmatively exercised. 47 Thus the states
have avoided the real danger to efficient administration, for as long as non-
action can successfully block a worthless claim of insanity, unwarranted
delay of execution will not result. In the Phyle and Solesbee cases it would
seem that the court has entered an area which it had formerly decided was
potentially dangerous, and one which the states have carefully avoided. If
the prohibition against execution of the insane is a due process right, claims
of denial of that right will have to be met, and with them will come an
indeterminate delay in administration "however informal and expeditious
the procedure.' '48
The Supreme Court has decided that due process, in some form, does not
end with a verdict of guilty, or with the pronouncement of sentence, or even
with confinement to await execution. The possibility of executing an insane
prisoner, though thought barbarous at common law, must be examined in the
light of the necessities of present judicial administration. The convict's life
has already been forfeited to the state in a proper judicial proceeding. No
doubt the strain of an impending execution is conducive to mental break-
42. The states must provide an adequate pobt-conviction method whereby claims of a
denial of rights may be raised. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1948) ; see Marino v. Ragen,
332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947) (concurring opinion).
43. See Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
44. See note 18 supra.
45. Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 P. 800 (1916).
46. Howell v. Todhunter, 181 Ark. 58, 25 S.W. 2d 21 (1930).
47. The state procedures range from a regular jury trial, (ILL. REV. STAT. C. 38, se.
593-594 (1949) ) to a determination by the Governor's Council (Juggins v. Executive
Council. 257 Mass. 386, 154 N.E. 72 (1926)).
48. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 70 Sup. Ct. 457, 465 (1950).
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